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STATE TAXATION OF MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS
Lewis B. Kaden *
State governments face the prospect of unprecedented fiscal crisis in the
next few years. Under pressure from continuing recession and cutbacks in
federal aid, state budget officials reported recently that revenues for the
current fiscal year were $7.9 billion below the projections made just six
months ago.' Service cuts and tax increases are the order of the day
throughout the nation. In these circumstances, any additional threat to
anticipated revenue is cause for serious concern. Yet, according to the Na-
tional Governors Association, constitutional challenges to state taxes on
the earnings of multinational corporations could cost the states as much as
$625 million this year.2
In our federal system, a state generally has discretion over the design of
its tax system as long as its taxes do not infringe upon the constitutional
rights of taxpayers.3 The constitution itself imposes just two explicit limita-
* Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law; A.B. 1963; LL.B. 1967,
Harvard University.
1. NATIONAL GOVERNORS' Assoc., FISCAL SURVEY OF THE STATES (1982). In July
1982, the National Conference of State Legislatures reported that a majority of states are
beset by "the worst fiscal conditions in 40 years." NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGIS-
LATURES, STATE BUDGET ACTIONS IN 1982 1 (1982).
2. MULTISTATE TAX COMM'N, SUMMARY OF STATE RESPONSES TO TREASURY DE-
PARTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE ON USE OF UNITARY METHOD AND TAXATION OF DIVIDEND
INCOME (1982). Thirteen states currently apply a unitary apportionment formula to the
worldwide income of multinational corporations: Alaska, California, Colorado, Idaho, Illi-
nois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Oregon
and Utah. G.A.O., KEY ISSUES AFFECTING STATE TAXATION OF MULTIJURISDICTIONAL
CORPORATE INCOME NEED RESOLVING 31 (1982) (Report to the Chairman, House Commit-
tee on Ways and Means) [hereinafter cited as G.A.O. REPORT]. The figure of $625 million
represents the official estimate of losses in these states, excluding Illinois, Indiana, Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire, and Oregon if the Supreme Court decides that the states are pre-
cluded from including foreign subsidiary earnings in a unitary tax base subject to
apportionment.
3. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 278-80 (1978); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney
Co., 311 U.S. 435,444 (1940). See generally P. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE
AND LOCAL TAXATION (1981). The Supreme Court has recently restated that "absent con-
gressional action ... the States' power to tax can be deprived only under the clearest consti-
tutional mandate." United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 738 (1982) (citing Michelin
Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 293 (1976)).
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tions on state taxing powers. Absent congressional consent, no state may
impose any "duty of tonnage"' or any tax on imports.' More significant,
however, are the constraints imposed on the states by the due process and
equal protection guarantees of the fourteenth amendment and by the nega-
tive implications of the federal power to regulate commerce.6 It is well
settled that due process obliges a state to ensure that its exercise of the
taxing power "bears fiscal relation to protection, opportunities and benefits
given by the state."7 In other words, the state must take care to impose its
taxes on activities which have a substantial linkage to the jurisdiction and
not on activities entirely unrelated to the state. At the same time, it is
clearly established that "net income taxes" are not direct levies on any
particular activity of a business. In the context of an income tax applied to
a corporation active in many states or foreign countries, the due process
question posed is whether the state's tax is fairly related to the activities
conducted in the state and the benefits conferred by the state.' Under the
commerce clause, the requirement is similar. A tax on interstate com-
merce will be upheld if it satisfies the requirements of due process, does
not discriminate against interstate or foreign trade and is "fairly appor-
tioned." 9 In addition, when foreign trade is involved, the state's levy may
also be challenged on the basis that it interferes with the national govern-
ment's capacity to "speak with a single voice" in the conduct of foreign
policy. 10
The requirement that the states "fairly apportion" the tax burden comes
into play when the subject or target of the state's action is involved in
4. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 3. See Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, 296 U.S. 261
(1935). The duty of tonnage clause does not bar local charges for specific services such as
pilotage or warfage. Coolely v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
5. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 5. It is well established, however, that a tax on income
from exports is not prohibited as a tax on exports. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165 (1918).
Also the Court recently held that a nondiscriminatory property tax could be imposed on
imports so long as they were no longer in transit. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages,- 423 U.S.
276 (1976).
6. See generaly J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
(4th ed. 1978); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 334-74 (1978).
7. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. at 444.
8. For early statements of the due process test, see Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249
U.S. 275 (1919); Louisville & Jefferson Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U.S. 385 (1903). The due
process requirement measures the result of the state's action, inquiring whether the tax lev-
ied amounts substantially to an unfair deprivation of the taxpayer's property because it lacks
a rational relationship to the business activities within the state. See Lathrop, Due Process
Considerations and the Apportionment of Dividend Income, 16 TAx NOTES 3 (July 5, 1982)
(Tax Analysts).
9. Department of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734
(1978); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
10. Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
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activity both within and without the taxing jurisdiction. For example, a
railroad car, a truck or other instrumentality of commerce on which the
state attempts to impose an ad valorem property tax may be within the
state's territory for only part of the time in any tax period. Similarly, a
corporation subject to a state income tax may conduct its business both
within the state and in other jurisdictions. Some method is obviously
needed to ensure that the value being taxed or the activity subject to tax is
sufficiently connected to the state to warrant the exercise of its revenue-
raising power. In the case of a property tax, various allocation techniques
are generally accepted, including an apportionment based on the time
spent within the state or the distance traveled on the state's highways or
railroad tracks." With respect to a corporate income tax, the most obvious
method of apportionment might be a separate accounting for profits attrib-
utable to in-state activities. This method is used to calculate federal in-
come tax liability under the Internal Revenue Code,' 2 and the Supreme
Court has upheld a state's decision to tax on the basis of separate ac-
counts.' 3 In many cases, however, separate accounting is neither fair nor
practical. A business equipment company, for example, may have its re-
search laboratory in Massachusetts, its manufacturing facilities in Penn-
sylvania, its distribution warehouse in New Jersey, and retail outlets in
California. An oil company may explore for oil and gas off the coast of
Louisiana, operate a refinery in Texas, and market its gasoline or heating
oil in Maryland. A major department store chain may have its executive
and managerial staff in New York, a warehouse in Indiana and its most
successful retail outlet in Virginia. In each of these cases, activities in sev-
eral states contribute to the company's earnings. Businesses tend to oper-
ate as a unit with an overall strategy aimed at increasing profitability in the
enterprise as a whole. Strategic decisions about the extent of centralized
control over purchasing, accounting or financing are based on a calcula-
tion of many factors, including the managerial style and preferences of the
senior officers. Separate accounting for earnings attributable to the Texas
refinery or the Massachusetts laboratory is neither possible nor likely to
produce a fair distribution of the tax burden. If the apportionment is
based on the firm's internal accounts, there is a potential for manipulation
11. Id; Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. Oklahoma, 290 U.S. 158 (1933) (number of cars in
state); Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194, aff'don rehearing, 166 U.S.
185 (1897); Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891) (mileage ration).
But see Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Missouri State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317 (1968) (mile-
age formula invalid when taxpayer shows resulting tax is grossly distorted).
12. I.R.C. § 482 (1976).
13. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 43.21.010 (repealed 1981).
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of income among the states in order to minimize tax liability. Nor should
the corporate form determine tax treatment. Whether the company
chooses to operate its diverse activities through divisions, subsidiaries or
joint ventures should not determine the constitutional limits of the state's
capacity to impose a tax. 4
In order to find a method of taxation in this kind of situation, most states
have adopted a method known as formula apportionment, that allocates
corporate profits earned from activities in many states or foreign countries
to the taxing jurisdiction. Reasonable apportionment formulas have been
consistently upheld by the Supreme Court in cases involving property, net
income or franchise taxes.' 5 As long as the activities are functionally re-
lated so that it is fair to treat the enterprise as a "unitary business," the
state may apportion earnings even if the activities take place in many
states and foreign countries.
Most typically, an apportionment formula for a corporate income tax
applies that proportion of the taxpayer's property, sales and payroll within
the state to the company's total earnings in order to determine the amount
of net income attributable to the taxing jurisdiction.' 6 However, the Court
has also approved the use of a single-factor formula, measuring simply the
amount of property' 7 or sales' 8 in the state as compared to overall prop-
erty or sales. Only rarely has the taxpayer been able to show that the state
is, in fact, taxing extra-territorial values or so grossly distorting the amount
of tax liability as to warrant an order invalidating a state tax formula."'
Until last year, the Supreme Court routinely rejected challenges to state
income tax apportionment schemes, including cases where apportionment
was applied to business enterprises conducted in part in foreign coun-
tries.2" Traditionally, neither due process nor the commerce clause has
14. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
15. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980); Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980); Bass, Ratcliff& Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n,
266 U.S. 271 (1924); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920); Ad-
ams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194 (1897).
16. The three-factor formula is incorporated in the Uniform Div. of Income for Tax
Purposes Act, 7 U.L.A. 91 (1957). See Pierce, The Uniform Division of Incomefor State Tax
Purposes, 35 TAXES 747 (1957).
17. Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924); Under-
wood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
18. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978); Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp,
308 U.S. 331 (1939).
19. Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Missouri State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317 (1968); Hans
Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
20. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980); Butler Bros. v. McCol-
gan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942); Bass, Ratcliff& Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271
(1924).
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required more than a rational relationship between the in-state activities
and the amount of income allocated to the state. Virtually any apportion-
ment formula based on factors such as sales, property or payroll has been
sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement that the state have a
means of roughly approximating the activity in the state to the amount of
income subject to tax. The Court had articulated a limiting principle that
formula apportionment was appropriate only where the diverse business
activities subject to apportionment were part of a "unitary" business.2
But, until 1982, no taxpayer had succeeded in avoiding formula apportion-
ment by arguing that his business was not sufficiently integrated to fit the
definition of a unitary business. Formula apportionment has been upheld
regardless of corporate form, the nature of the business or the fact that it
was conducted partly through foreign subsidiaries. In two 1980 cases, in
fact, the Supreme Court rejected challenges to this method of apportion-
ment. The Court denied Mobile Corporation's attack on Vermont's
formula to apportion the company's worldwide income,22 as well as Ex-
xon's effort to invalidate Wisconsin's inclusion of production and refining
income in earnings subject to apportionment, despite the fact that Exxon
was engaged solely in retail activity within the state.23
Recently, however, an increasing number of states have applied formula
apportionment to the worldwide activities of multinational corporations in
circumstances which have provoked the opposition of foreign governments
and produced a surging of litigation challenging apportionment schemes.
The modern multinational corporation is a far-flung enterprise, active in
markets scattered throughout the world. Decisions on the location of dif-
ferent facilities are commonly based on a complex set of factors, including
financing, government relations, regulation, labor conditions and market-
ing opportunities. The corporation's activities are usually directed from a
central headquarters where strategic decisions are made and communi-
cated to units around the world. Professor Vernon describes the multina-
tional corporation as "a cluster of corporations of diverse nationality
joined together by ties of common ownership and responsive to a common
management strategy."24 Most commentators have concluded that the
21. The term "unitary business" is most often used to describe the circumstance of two
or more corporate entities engaged in activities sufficiently interdependent to justify a taxing
jurisdiction in treating them as a single enterprise and requiring a combined report of their
earnings. See G. ALTMAN & F. KEESLING, ALLOCATION OF INCOME IN STATE TAXATION
101 (1946); Dexter, The Unitary Concept in State Income Taxation of Multistate-Multina-
tional Business, 10 URB. LAW. 181 (1978).
22. Mobil, 445 U.S. 425.
23. Exxon, 447 U.S. 207.
24. Vernon, Economic Sovereignty at Bay, 47 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 110, 114 (1968).
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typical multinational considers its diverse components "parts of the single
global system whose overall success, rather than that of any individual
component, is considered critical."25 Although the degree of centralized
control exercised by a multinational depends to a considerable extent on
the preference and style of the particular firm, a survey of 127 large Ameri-
can corporations with subsidiaries in western Europe indicates a trend to-
ward increased centralization.26 More significantly, Professor Solomon
found that a corporate commitment to decentralized control may, in fact,
be misleading. In one particular case he noted that "a decentralization
ideology masks the reality of centralization in which one corporate nerve
center devised a common corporate strategy and made fundamental deci-
sions regarding production, market, finance and research. Discipline and
continuity was maintained through common training and coordination." 27
In general, most observers of the multinational corporation believe the
extent of centralized control is a function of strategic plans and corporate
style. The entity pursues its objectives on a global scale, evaluating oppor-
tunities in terms of their potential contribution to the worldwide goals of
the enterprise. The location of particular activities and the form in which
they are pursued depend upon a multifaceted analysis made by those re-
sponsible for directing the corporation.
Two important issues have recently come before the Supreme Court in
cases concerning the effects of state taxing decisions on multinational
firms. The first concerns the propriety of "unitary" tax treatment for pur-
poses of determining which sources of income are subject to apportion-
ment. In ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission2' and F W
Woolworth, Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Department of New Mexico ,29 both
decided in June 1982, the Supreme Court invalidated the inclusion of divi-
dends paid by foreign subsidiaries in an apportionable tax base on grounds
that the activities of the taxpayer's foreign affiliates were not part of its
unitary business. Second, assuming a business is "unitary," the question
arises as to whether the Constitution bars combined reporting of income
earned by foreign affiliates with the domestic profits of the taxpayer. In
January 1983, the Court heard argument in Container Corporation v.
25. Note, Multinational Corporations and Income Allocations Under Section 482 of the
InternalRevenue Code, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1202 (1976).
26. L. SOLOMON, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE EMERGING WORLD OR-
DER 21 (1978).
27. Id at 20.
28. 102 S. Ct. 3102 (1982).
29. 102 S. Ct. 3128 (1982).
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Franchise Tax Board,30 an appeal from a California state court decision
rejecting the taxpayer's claim that worldwide combined reporting violates
the requirements of due process and the negative commerce clause.
I. DEFINING A UNITARY BUSINESS: ASARCO AND WOOLWORTH
In both ASARCO and F W Woolworth the Supreme Court found that
foreign subsidiaries of a United States corporation were engaged in "sepa-
rate and discrete" or "unrelated" business activities, and, therefore, that
the dividends received from those affiliates could not be included in the
unitary tax base subject to state apportionment. By describing the unitary
business principle as "the lynchpin of apportionability," the majority ap-
peared to define the due process requirement of a rational relationship be-
tween in-state activity and the amount of income allocated to the state in
terms of whether the subsidiaries' contribution to income resulted from
"functional integration, centralization of management and economies of
scale." 3'
ASARCO is engaged in the nonferrous mining business. Its activity is
conducted through a large number of affiliates throughout the world, in-
cluding six foreign companies in which ASARCO's interests range from
34% to 53%.32 ASARCO operated silver mining facilities in the state of
Idaho, and its activity in that state represented 2.5% of companywide prop-
erty, payroll and sales. 3 3 The Court found insufficient evidence of the
"unitizing" factors of ownership, managerial control, and economies of
scale, and thereby precluded Idaho from including dividends received
from these foreign affiliates in the unitary tax base used to apportion the
state's franchise tax. While there was a significant flow of products and
intracorporate trade from the subsidiaries to the parent, this did not consti-
tute, in the majority's view, a sufficient justification for unitary treatment.
F.W. Woolworth operates chains of retail outlets through affiliates, in a
manner similar to that of ASARCO's operations, in various countries as
well as throughout the United States. Each affiliate is involved in an iden-
tical type of business, but the parent has adopted a decentralized manage-
30. 117 Cal. App. 3d 988, 173 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1981), prob. juris noted, 456 U.S. 960
(1982).
31. F W Woolworth Co., 102 S. Ct. at 3125 (quoting Mobil, 445 U.S. at 438). See also
Butler Bros., 315 U.S. 501.
32. ASARCO, 102 S. Ct. at 3106 n.2. ASARCO's affiliates were Southern Peru Copper
Corp. (51.5%), M.I.M. Holdings, Ltd. (53%), General Cable Corp. (34%) and ASARCO
Mexicana, S.A. (49%). Three of these affiliates-Southern Peru Copper, M.I.M. Holdings
and ASARCO Mexicana S.A.-conducted business only outside of the United States.
33. Id. at 3105.
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ment strategy. Although local autonomy is a product of Woolworth's
strategic preferences and style of operation, the Court found that "thepo-
tential to operate a company as part of the unitary business is not disposi-
tive" in circumstances where the "underlying economic realities" suggest a
lack of functional integration. 4 The Justices emphasized the lack of cen-
tralized training, accounting controls, lending, purchasing, personnel ex-
change, central participation in selecting store locations as well as a lack of
a "flow of international business."3 5 These factors led to the conclusion
that the foreign affiliates constituted "discrete business enterprises" sepa-
rate and unrelated to the activity in New Mexico, the taxing state asserting
its right to apportion on a unitary basis.
In Container Corporation v. Franchise Tax Board, the taxpayer also chal-
lenged the state's inclusion of foreign subsidiary earnings and the base
subject to apportionment on grounds that the business was not appropriate
for "unitary treatment." Container Corporation had in fact stipulated
facts showing a considerable amount of integration, centralized control
and economies of scale in the relationship between parent and foreign sub-
sidiaries. Both the parent and the affiliates were engaged in the same line
of business. The parent owned a controlling interest in all twenty subsidi-
aries and a majority of all directors were persons not resident in the local
country. The stipulation also showed parental influence over financing,
technical services, personnel training, purchasing, controls over proprie-
tary information, major policy decisions, auditing, insurance and legal
services, budget reviews, and capital financing. Despite these facts, the
taxpayer argued that absence of a significant flow of goods or trade be-
tween the subsidiaries and the parent was enough to defeat the state's at-
tempt to "unitize" the business. In other words, Container Corp. sought a
ruling that a substantial flow of goods is a necessary requirement for a
manufacturing or a merchantile enterprise to qualify for unitary tax treat-
ment. While ASARCO held that a "flow of goods" alone did not mean
that affiliated companies were unitary, Container Corp. argued that this
finding should be essential to unitary treatment.
Obviously, the presence of operational interdependence in a case where
products are made in one country and sold in another is highly suggestive
of the kind of functional integration or contribution of the foreign based
activity to domestic earnings that underlies the justification for apportion-
ment. Historically, apportionment was created to deal with problems in-
volving companies that geographically separated manufacturing and
34. FW Woolworth Co., 102 S. Ct. at 3134.
35. Id. at 3139.
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marketing operations. In Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax
Comm'n the Court stated this problem meant that "[tihe legislature in at-
tempting to put upon this business its fair share of the burden of taxation
was faced with the impossibility of allocating specifically the profits earned
by the processes conducted within its borders."' 36 Fifteen years ago, Pro-
fessor Hellerstein wrote that this "impossibility" explains not only the ori-
gins but also the limits of unitary tax treatment. 37  He noted that
nonoperating functions may be centralized but "the costs of these central-
ized operations can be spread by cost accounting methods regularly used
by accountants. . . and do not involve the elusive effort to segregate prof-
its between interdependent stages in operations such as producing in one
state and selling in another. ' 38 Thus, Professor Hellerstein concluded that
such centralized nonoperating functions "ought not lay the basis for hold-
ing the enterprise unitary . . .[because] so broad a sweep formulary ap-
portionment tends to push distortion and misallocation to unacceptable
levels."
39
Professor Hellerstein's view seems to be carrying the day with a majority
on the Supreme Court. As Justice O'Connor noted in her sharply worded
36. Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271, 281 (1924).
37. Hellerstein, Recent Developments in State Tax Apportionment and the Circumscrip-
tion of Unitary Business, 21 NAT'L TAx J. 487 (1968).
38. Id. at 501-02.
39. Id. Professor Hellerstein's formulation is quoted at length in Appellant's Brief on
the Merits at 48, Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 51 U.S.L.W. 4987 (U.S. June 27,
1983). Mobil and ASARCO both involved the treatment of dividends received from corpo-
rate affiliates, while Container Corp. concerns the validity of California's combined reporting
of earnings from all affiliates. Some comments treat them as separate and distinct issues-
the "combination method" issue and the "apportionable income" issue. See, e.g., Brief of
Amicus Curiae Multistate Tax Comm'n and Participating States at 9-10 & n.15, Container
Corp.; Dexter, Post Oral Argument comments on ASARCO and Woolworth, 15 TAX NOTES
867 (June 14, 1982); Note, The Supreme Court 1981 Term, Due Process, 96 HARV. L. REV.
77, 92-95 (1982). Under this view, ASARCO is objectionable because dividends ought to be
treated simply as intracorporate transfers, and an emphasis on the "dividend" nature of the
unitary business income allows a multinational corporation to manipulate earnings in order
to reduce taxes. See Keesling, The Impact of the Mobil case on Apportionment of Income,
B.Y.U. L. REV. 87, 103 (1981); Peters, Supreme Court's Mobil Decision on Multistate Income
Apportionment Raises New Questions, 53 J. TAX'N 36, 40 (1980). But the Supreme Court
seems to treat both issues the same-whether the activities of the business are sufficiently
interpreted to justify combination and unitary tax apportionment. See, e.g., Russell Stover
Candies, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 103 S. Ct. 26 (1982), vacating and remanding Ward
Paper Box Co. v. Department of Revenue, 638 P.2d 1053 (Mont. 1981). A state may decide
to use dividends as a rough and available measure of foreign affiliate earnings because of
doubts about any other accounting method. The critical inquiry still focuses on the realtion-
ship of activity within the state's taxing jurisdiction to activity outside of the state's taxing
jurisdiction.
19831
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dissent to both ASARCO and Woolworth ,40 this view may be at odds with
the concern over state sovereignty in the interests of federalism evident in
other recent opinions. But, whatever the Court's view of the reach of the
unitary business principle, Professor Hellerstein's opinion may not be
either historically correct or consistent with the practical realities of oper-
ating a modern multinational corporation. Since the Bass case was de-
cided in 1924, it has been clearly established that a state may include the
earnings of overseas branches in the income base subject to apportion-
ment. The Court also has indicated repeatedly that practical economic cir-
cumstances, not the corporate form adopted by the multinational,
determines whether it qualifies for "unitary" treatment. Regardless of the
form the company adopts, whether it conducts its business through divi-
sions, subsidiaries or joint ventures and whether the activity is limited to
the United States or extends to foreign countries, the unitary business prin-
ciple requires simply that the component parts of the business be so inter-
related and interdependent that they form one business, not separate and
discrete business enterprises.
This limitation on the state's capacity to use formula apportionment de-
rives its force from the due process requirement that there be at least a
connection between the corporation's tax liability and the activity con-
ducted in the state and the benefits conferred by the state. Since a tax on
income is not a direct levy on any particular business transaction, the in-
clusion of different activities into a single tax base is justified only if there
exists some degree of interrelationship among the parts. Such a relation-
ship can be shown by evidence that the activities within the taxing state
depend upon or contribute to the functions of the business as a whole.
4'
When the Court speaks of the unities of function, managerial control, and
40. ASARCO, 102 S. Ct. at 3117; FW Woolworth, 102 S. Ct. at 3140. Justice
O'Connor's dissent was joined by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist.
41. G. ALTMAN & F. KEESLING, supra note 21, at 101. In several states, unitary tax
treatment will be applied so long as the business activity outside the state bears a relation-
ship of dependency and contribution to in-state activity. See, e.g., Wisconsin Dep't of Reve-
nue v. Exxon, 90 Wisc. 2d 700, 281 N.W.2d 94 (1979), aft'd, 477 U.S. 207 (1980); Edison
California Stores, Inc. v. McColgan, 30 Cal. 2d 472 (1947); Crawford Mfg. Co. v. State
Comm'n of Revenue & Tax, 180 Kan. 352, 304 P.2d 504 (1956). A few state courts do
require functional or operational integration. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Advance-Wilson
Industries, 456 Pa. 200, 317 A.2d 642 (1974). At least since 1942 the Supreme Court has
consistently emphasized unity of ownership, managerial control and use. Butler Bros., 315
U.S. 501. One commentator seems to find the test of mutual dependency and contribution
"a more relaxed standard" than integration. Note, supra note 39, at 88-89. But as recently
as Mobil the Supreme Court noted that a unitary business may have "contributions to in-
come resulting from functional integration, centralization of management, and economics of
scale." 445 U.S. at 438. The Court referred to this statement in both ASARCO and Wool-
worth. It would appear that the unities of ownership, control and use (including the econo-
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economies of scale, it is describing guidelines for determining whether
there exists enough interrelationship and mutual dependency to make it
"fair" and consistent with due process to combine the activities of the dif-
ferent constituent parts for the purpose of apportioning the tax burden
among the states. It is the result that matters, and separate accounting may
not be used to impeach an apportionment formula in the absence of evi-
dence that the resulting liability is unfair or excessive.
4 2
For example, in Butler Brothers v. McColgan, 4 the company operated
seven department stores in seven different states, but controlled the opera-
tions from executive offices in Chicago. Economies were realized by the
technique of centralized purchasing. On a separate accounting basis, the
company was able to show that its retail outlet in California showed a net
loss, but the California sales contributed to the values produced for the
whole enterprise by centralized purchasing, which in turn were critical to
the profitability of the business as a whole. This relationship plainly justi-
fied the state's determination to allocate some of the income to California
by using the apportionment formula based on sales, property and payroll.
Evidence of a "flow of goods" indicates the requisite degree of interdepen-
dence, but even without it, there may still be more than enough central
management and direction to warrant unitary treatment. In a dispursed
network of enterprises common to the modern corporation, each decision
concerning services, training, financing, or trade is inevitably part of a
comprehensive strategy. What should matter for the purposes of due pro-
cess is the economic relationship among the disparate parts and not the
managerial preferences expressed in a particular arrangement. In constitu-
tional terms, the resulting apportionment of tax liability is significant. The
proper constitutional inquiry, therefore, is whether an allocation of liabil-
ity represents a fair approximation of a rational relationship between in-
mies of scale that result from integration) are examples that define the meaning of the
"contribution" required to qualify a business for unitary tax treatment.
42. Mobil, 445 U.S. 425; Exxon, 447 U.S. 207. Butler Bros., 315 U.S. 501. See Brief of
Amicus Curiae Multistate Tax Comm'n and Participating States at 6, Container Corp.
Container Corp. argued, though, that its separate accounting analysis could be used to im-
peach formula apportionment so long as it is supplemented by "evidence explaining why the
formula is inadequate and persuades an unfair result." In that event, Container Corp. main-
tained that "at a minimum, the burden of proof shifts to the state." Appellant's Reply Brief
at 12 n.13, Container Corp.. See Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Missouri State Tax Comm'n, 390
U.S. 317 (1968); Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123
(1931). In fact, both parties seems to agree that the taxpayers must show that formula pro-
duces an "unfair result." That is the essence of the due process test. An analysis of separate
accounting results alone will not be enough. The taxpayers and the Multistate Tax Commis-
sion differed sharply on the issue of whether the company had made the required showing.
43. 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
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state activity and the entire enterprise or whether the relationship is grossly
distorted. Making fine distinction among ASARCO's foreign subsidiaries
based upon the degree of parental control evident in the makeup of the
board of directors or between Woolworth's operating divisions and its for-
eign affiliates based on the extent of managerial autonomy misses the
point. Due process requires only that the earnings allocated bear a fair
relationship to the amount of in-state activity. In this sense, the definition
of a unitary business or apportionable sources of income tends to merge
with the underlying due process issue presented in Container Corporation.
That is, does combined worldwide reporting by a multinational excessively
distort the income attributed to the taxing state or interfere with the need
for national uniformity in the exercise of foreign policy?
II. COMBINED WORLDWIDE REPORTING
Along with twelve other states, California requires a unitary business to
report the earnings of all its affiliates throughout the world on a combined
basis. The combined income is then apportioned based on the ratio of
sales, property, and payroll in California to worldwide totals for these
three factors." Container Corp. objected to the inclusion of its foreign sub-
sidiaries' income in the unitary base. In the three tax years involved in the
case, the company reported worldwide earnings averaging $41.7 million
based on its internal accounts.45 California's requirement for combined
reporting had the effect of increasing the amount allocated to the United
States from $28 million to $32 million a year and the income attributed to
California from an average of $3 million to $3.4 million.46 The state ap-
plied its franchise tax rate to that revised amount of net income. The tax-
payer argued that the obligation to include earnings from foreign
subsidiaries in the apportionable tax base violated due process by dis-
torting the income fairly attributed to California because lower unit pay-
roll costs and other differences made its overseas activities significantly
more profitable than its United States operations. The taxpayer also ar-
gued that the combined report violated the foreign commerce clause be-
cause (1) it resulted in double taxation of foreign earnings already taxed
44. This is the same three-factor apportionment formula used by at least thirty nine
states. See G.A.O. REPORT, supra note 2, at 13.
45. Appellant's Brief on the Merits at 17, Container Corp. (citing Schedule VI to Exh. 1,
Stip. re testimoney, Jr. App. 109-13). In Container Corp.'s reply brief at appendix A, the
chart comparing arms-length earnings and apportionment earnings is restated by the tax-
payer, based upon taxable separate accounting for Container (U.S.) and book separate ac-
counting for the foreign subsidiaries. This "restatement" produces a combined average
annual income of $45.137 million for the years 1913-1965.
46. Id. at 16.
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abroad; (2) it interfered with the national interest in uniformity in the con-
duct of foreign policy; and (3) it was preempted by the provisions of bilat-
eral international treaties and other principles of international law. 7
But for the radiating implications from the ASARCO and Woolworth
decisions, one would think the taxpayer faced a difficult task in establish-
ing gross distortion under the due process clause. Assuming that its busi-
ness is unitary, previous Supreme Court decisions have suggested that
foreign income may be included in a tax base subject to apportionment,
whether those earnings are the profits of foreign divisions or intracorporate
dividends paid by separately incorporated subsidiaries.4" Thus, a facial at-
tack on the California apportionment statute should not succeed, and
Container Corp. has the obligation to show by specific evidence that the
formula grossly distorts the amount of its income attributed to the state of
California. On this point, the Multistate Tax Commission in its brief as
amicus curiae effectively rebuts the taxpayer's proof.4 9 The company's
profits showing internal separate accounts are not necessarily equal to tax-
able income under the Internal Revenue Code or earnings subject to tax
under the laws of the foreign countries in which the company does busi-
ness. Nor is it appropriate to use internal accounts in circumstances where
a parent corporation can determine for itself the extent to which its subsid-
iaries are charged for various centralized services or equipment. The wage
cost differences in foreign operations alone should have no more bearing
under the due process clause than a comparable argument against appor-
tionment of earnings by combining activity in various states within the
union. ° Moreover, a three factor apportionment formula has tended to
produce an average approximation of income producing activity within
the state. One factor, such as payroll, can not be taken separately to prove
distortion.5" Even if the company's profitability based on investment is
greater abroad, this evidence alone fails to substantiate a claim of distor-
47. Id at 21-36.
48. Mobil, 445 U.S. 425 (1980); Bass, 266 U.S. 271.
49. The Multistate Tax Commission is the administrative agency of the Multistate Tax
Compact, which is a device for achieving uniformity and cooperation among the states in
tax administration. Currently, 19 states and the District of Columbia have subscribed to the
compact as full members and 14 other states have entered as associate members. The Court
rejected a constitutional challenge to the compact in United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate
Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978).
50. Compare Appellant's Brief on the Merits at 15, Container Corp. with Brief of Ami-
cus Curiae Multistate Tax Comm'n and Participating States at 16-17, Container Corp. The
taxpayer cited its own study showing unit labor cost in its Cali, Columbia plant was only
about 40% that of its California facilities.
51. See Norfolk & Western Ry. v. North Carolina, 297 U.S. 682, 688 (1936); North
American Cement Corp. v. Graves, 299 U.S. 517 (1936).
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tion. Multinational corporations frequently conduct research and develop-
ment programs in domestic facilities to the point where they have a proven
product before expanding production and marketing in other countries. In
such circumstances, an allocation based on relative profitability as a factor
of investment might itself misrepresent the contribution of domestic activi-
ties to those worldwide earnings.
The taxpayer in Container Corp. argued at length that it had produced
evidence showing why the formula was inadequate and produced an un-
fair result and that in circumstances where such evidence is produced, the
burden of proof shifts to the state.12 The company conceded that separate
accounts by themselves do not establish unfairness, and that the Court
must examine the results produced by the formula. The Multistate Tax
Commission argued in its brief that the relevant comparison was between
Container Corp's United States source federal taxable income as reported
to the IRS and the company's combined income apportioned to United
States sources under the California formula. By this analysis, it calculated
the difference for the years in question as only $1.4 million, or approxi-
mately 3.23% more earnings allocated to United States activity under the
California apportionment formula than is attributed to the United States
for federal income tax purposes. Since the California formula allocates 8%
of worldwide income to the state, the actual result is an increase in net
income tax by California of an average of $11 5,000.53 According to the
Commission, the difference in tax resulting from the state's formula is "de
minimus particularly when California's net income tax is deductable for
federal income tax purposes. Furthermore, if the foregoing adjustments
take into account foreign source income which is included in federal taxa-
ble income and the difference between federal depreciation and California
depreciation deductions, this slight difference disappears."54 If this ana-
lytic approach is sound, no case of gross distortion can be shown.
52. Appellant's Reply Brief at 12 n.13, Container Corp. and Appellant's Brief on the
Merits at 20, Container Corp. (citing as Norfolk & Western Ry., 390 U.S. 317, 329.) In fact,
the Court in Norfolk stated that
when a taxpayer comes forward with strong evidence tending to prove that the...
formula will yield a grossly distorted result in its particular case, the State is
obliged to counter that evidence. . . .If it fails to do so and if the record shows
that the taxpayer has sustained the burden of proof to show that the tax is so exces-
sive as to burden interstate commerce, the taxpayer must prevail.
Norfolk & Western Ry., 390 U.S. at 329.
53. Brief of Amicus Curiae Multistate Tax Comm'n and Participating States at 19,
Container Corp.
54. Id. California Law provides for apportionment relief in the event the formula pro-
duces an unfair result out of line with the taxpayer's business activity in the state. CAL. REV.
& TAX CODE § 25137 (West 1979). Container Corp. did not request this form of relief.
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An evaluation of this kind of evidence is, however, a complex task, re-
quiring a more technical analysis than the Court may be able to provide.
State tax formulas are not the only context in which the Court is called
upon to deal with complex economic or technical information. But this
area scarcely lends itself to the kind of broad generalizations common to
due process jurisprudence. The state of California argued that there
should be a presumption favoring the state's taxing power and that the
taxpayer has the burden to show gross distortion by clear evidence. If this
is the test, Container Corp. should have long odds against it, at least on the
due process argument.
The state's problems may be greater, however, in the foreign commerce
clause issues. Decisions under the commerce clause are, of course, subject
to congressional override. 5 In an area like state tax apportionment ap-
plied to multinational corporations where the Court might justifiably be
concerned about the effect of state actions conflicting with the conduct of
foreign policy, the possibility that a judicial ruling may stimulate action in
Congress should provide some comfort to the Justices as they consider the
state's formula. Indeed, in ASARCO and Woolworth, Chief Justice Burger
concurred separately to emphasize his conviction that the decision should
be grounded on the negative commerce clause and not on the fourteenth
amendment, and explicitly invited Congress to consider the problem of
state tax apportionment.56 Although Congress has debated proposals in
this area, and the General Accounting Office has conducted numerous
studies of state tax apportionment, the legislature has not been able to
forge a consensus sufficient to enact uniform rules.
The most recent case involving the foreign commerce clause as a con-
straint on state and local taxing authority is Japan Line Ltd v. County of
Los Angeles .57 A Japanese company owned containers that were physi-
cally located for at least part of the year within the Los Angeles port. The
55. In Moorman Mfg., 437 U.S. 267, 280, the Court said "[it is clear that the legislative
power granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution would amply justify
the enactment of legislation requiring all States to adhere to uniform rules for the division of
income." See also Mobil, 445 U.S. at 449. In contrast, Congress is generally precluded from
authorizing state actions inconsistent with the requirements of due process under judicial
constitutions of the fourteenth amendment. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970);
Katzenbach v. Morgan 384 U.S. 641 (1966). Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due
Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603 (1975); Monaghan, Foreword Constitu-
tional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975); Cox, Foreword ConstitutionalAdjudication
and the Protection of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1966).
56. 102 S. Ct. at 3115 n.23. The GAO study issued in 1982 indicated that proposals for
a uniform system of interstate taxation have been introduced every year since 1965. See
G.A.O. REPORT, supra note 2, at 6.
57. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
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Supreme Court held that application of the tax, even if fairly apportioned
in relation to the amount of time in the jurisdiction, violated the negative
commerce clause because it resulted in double taxation of property already
fully taxed in Japan and because it interfered with the nation's capacity to
speak with a single voice in the conduct of foreign trade and foreign af-
fairs. Japan Line, however, involved a property tax on an instrumentality
owned by a foreign company and used exclusively in foreign trade. The
Court has recently questioned the relevance of the Japan Line opinion to
the apportionment of corporate income taxes. In Mobil the Court stated:
[Mobil's] attempted analogy between this case and Japan Line
strikes us as forced. That case involved ad valorem property taxes
assessed directly upon instrumentalities of foreign commerce. As
has been noted, the factors favoring use of the allocation method
in property taxation has no immediate applicability to an income
tax.58
Unlike a property tax, income taxes are not direct levies on commercial
activity. Nevertheless, some of the reasons supporting the Japan Line deci-
sion, including the fear of recrimination from other taxing authorities and
the risk of multiple burdens of taxation, might be grounds for concern
about income taxes. At first blush, the possibility of double taxation does
seem to exist when the overseas earnings included in an apportionable in-
come base have already been subjected to tax in the foreign country in
which the activity takes place. In Japan Line, the container itself had actu-
ally been subjected to full property taxation in Japan. Any ad valorem
levy in the United States would, therefore, inevitably create multiple tax
burdens. The underlying concept of income apportionment by formula,
however, belies the double taxation argument. Formula apportionment
does not aim at taxing extraterritorial activity. Rather, its function is to
make available to taxing officials a technique for approximating the value
of in-state activities. When the diverse components of a business each con-
tribute to the combined profits, the formula looks to certain objective fac-
tors by which to measure a fair proportion of income borne by in-state
activity in relation to the total enterprise and then uses that ratio to allo-
cate a part of the combined earnings to the taxing state. The critical in-
quiry in each case, then, is whether a formula excessively distorts the value
of the business carried on in the state by attributing too much income to
that activity. If it does not have that kind of distorting effect, then, by
definition, the apportionment formula produces a fair approximation of
in-state values as measured by a fair and reasonable apportionment
58. 445 U.S. at 448.
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formula. The only multiple burdens in such a case are those imposed as a
result of a federal system which accepts the prospect of taxation by both
federal and state governments, and limits the effect of this double taxation
by making state payouts deductible from federal taxable income.
The fact that overseas earnings have been taxed by foreign tax collectors
cannot change this result. If the foreign country uses separate, arms-length
accounting or some formula other than sales, payroll and property, there
will be some distortion in the allocation of income to different jurisdic-
tions, but the same result will occur if one state in the union uses separate
accounts or a single factor formula, options explicitly approved by the
Supreme Court in earlier cases.59 Seen this way, in the case of income
taxation at least, the double taxation argument merges into the due process
question of gross distortion.
The argument that formula apportionment for purposes of state income
taxes interferes with the conduct of foreign policy also has initial appeal.
Where a unitary tax with worldwide combined reporting is imposed on a
foreign parent which has domestic affiliates in the taxing state, bilateral
treaties may limit the state's authority to apply its apportionment formula.
That issue was raised directly in Shell Petroleum N. V v. Graves6 ° in which
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently affirmed
a district court ruling dismissing Shell's complaint.6' Shell N.V., a Nether-
lands multinational, with its domestic affiliates, held a substantial interest
in two United States companies doing business in California. The district
court held that Shell lacked standing to protest assessments against the
taxpayers, and that the state's administrative procedures had not pro-
ceeded far enough to make the controversy ripe for constitutional adjudi-
cation. Domestic treatment for tax purposes of a foreign domiciliary
corporation is an issue which may be governed by the provisions of vari-
ous bilateral treaties for the avoidance of double taxation. The district
court judge in Shell Petroleum indicated that the United States-Nether-
lands convention against double taxation did not give a Dutch corporation
the right in its capacity as shareholder to assert claims on behalf of its
American subsidiary. But some observers read these tax conventions to
require that state governments, as well as the United States, adopt the sep-
arate accounting method for the calculation of earnings subject to tax.62
The treaty provisions which generally refer to "nationals and companies"
of the foreign country, however, may not apply to subsidiaries incorpo-
59. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg., 437 U.S. 267; Bass, 266 U.S. 27.
60. No. 82-4535 (6th Cir. Jun. 30, 1983).
61. No. 81-4302 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 1982), aff'd, No. 82-4535 (6th Cir. Jun. 30, 1983).
62. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Shell Petroleum N.V. at 8-9, Container Corp.
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rated in the United States.6 3 Last term, in a case testing the allocation of
employment discrimination regulations to a domestic subsidiary of a Japa-
nese company, the Supreme Court ruled that the United States affiliate
was not an extension of a foreign parent for purposes of protection under
the treaty between Japan and the United States.' Therefore, to permit a
state to require combined reporting of worldwide earnings where the for-
eign parent conducts business in California through a separately incorpo-
rated subsidiary but not where it conducts that same business itself seems
inconsistent with the Court's repeated warnings that economic realities,
and not corporate form, should govern cases involving state taxing power.
Moreover, a strong argument can be made that the bilateral tax treaties
uniformly accept state taxation under reasonable apportionment formulas,
and anticipate that the Supreme Court will give meaning to the constitu-
tional requirement of "reasonableness."65 In fact, the Senate recently re-
jected a treaty provision which would have prevented the use of formula
apportionment by the states in circumstances where a British company had
contact with the United States only through a domestic subsidiary.66
At least in cases involving a domestic parent corporation, there should
be considerable doubt whether the double taxation treaties can properly be
read to limit the state's otherwise acceptable use of formula apportion-
ment. In oral argument last year, the Solicitor General of the United States
argued the formula apportionment of unitary business income including
overseas earnings "does not violate any provisions of any particular
treaty."67 Except for protections against discrimination,68 the double taxa-
tion treaties exclude United States state and local governments from their
application and reciprocally anticipate the imposition of taxes by subna-
tional units of the foreign government as well.69 While these treaties gener-
63. See, e.g., Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Kingdom of the Netherlands For the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention
of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income and Certain Other Taxes, signed at
Wash., D.C., Apr. 29, 1948, 62 Stat. 1757, T.I.A.S. No. 1885, as amended by the Supplemen-
tary Convention, signed at Wash., D.C., Dec. 30, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 891, T.I.A.S. No. 6051.
64. Sumitomo Shogi America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
65. See Appellee's Brief on the Merits at 124-26, Contain Corp.
66. Tax Treaties With the United Kingdom, the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of the
Philiopines." Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1977).
67. Transcript at 18, Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor, 51 U.S.L.W.
3937 (Jul. 6, 1983), dismissing appealfrom 84 II. 2d 102, 417 N.E,2d 1343 (1981).
68. See, e.g., Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty between the United States
and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, art. X, XI, para. 4, signed at the Hague, Mar. 27, 1956,
8 U.S.T. 2043, T.I.A.S. 3942.
69. For example, the Treasury Department's comments on a proposed Convention be-
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ally provide that neither country will tax income not "reasonably allocable
or apportionable" to the taxing jurisdiction, the State Department has reg-
ularly noted that this language does not apply to United States companies
and that it does not bar formula apportionment by the states under formu-
las consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Mobil.7 ° Combined
reporting of worldwide income for state apportionment does not frustrate
the achievement of federal objectives in foreign policy as those goals are
expressed in statutes or treaties having the effect of law, and the Court
must treat the issue under the negative commerce clause and not under
preemption cases.
Retaliation by foreign governments, however, is possible as unitary tax-
ation is adopted by more states. The recent spread of combined reporting
requirements has provoked response in several foreign capitols. Last year
Parliament debated the possibility of a reciprocal unitary tax on United
States companies doing business in Britain.7' The Netherlands govern-
ment is participating in Shell Petroleum .72 Nonetheless, careful analysis
suggests that if a state apportionment formula passes the due process test
on the basis of an examination of the resulting liability, it should not be
found to increase the risk of multiple tax burdens or to interfere with the
conduct of foreign policy.
These arguments might be thought to support a prediction that Califor-
nia's application of the unitary tax and combined reporting should be up-
held. But the widespread use of combined reports among the states in
recent years has, in fact, created considerable controversy, not with-
standing the fact that foreign governments were generally silent at the time
the Court decided Bass and Mobil and rejected similar arguments con-
cerning the inclusion in a unitary tax base of foreign earnings. Perhaps as
a result of this pressure, the Solicitor General appeared on behalf of the
Reagan Administration in the unitary tax case argued last term and urged
tween the United States and the U.S.S.R. for the Avoidance of Double Taxation included
the following statement:
The taxes imposed by the Union Republic of the Soviet Union (comparable to
states of the United States) are not concerned by the convention because in keeping
with the post United States policy, the taxes of the state and local governments of
the United States are excluded from the scope of the convention, except for pur-
poses of article X (non-discrimination).
See Appellee's Brief on the Merits at 125-27, Container Corp.
70. Id at 126 n.31. See Exxon Corp. v. Wisc. Dept. of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
71. House of Commons, Official Report, 27 April 1982, vol. 22, no. 105, C. 823-8.
72. See Brief of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands as Amicus Curiae,
Shell Petroleum. Japan also filed a Brief amicus curiae. On June 29, 1982, the government
of Belgium, acting on behalf of the European Economic Community, protested to the State
Department that apportionment of worldwide earnings was "entirely unsatisfactory."
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the Court to find that "the combined apportionment method applied to a
unitary business with foreign corporate constituents is barred by the com-
merce clause [because] it creates a substantial risk of international multiple
taxation and impairs federal uniformity in the conduct of foreign rela-
tions.",73 The nation's governors promptly protested this appearance, argu-
ing directly to President Reagan that the federal government could not ask
the states to take on more responsibility for public services and at the same
time deny them access to the unitary business tax as a source of revenue. 4
Given a proper understanding of the purpose and workings of formula
apportionment, the Solicitor General's arguments about multiple tax bur-
dens do not seem persuasive. Nor is his concern about disturbing the "uni-
form international custom" of separate income accounting convincing.
Formula apportionment by the states, so long as it is nondiscriminatory
and reasonable, has been a feature of United States tax policy since the
1920's and an accepted backdrop in every bilateral negotiation of tax trea-
ties. Yet, the Administration's plea that taxation of multinational business
ought to be a matter over which "the freedom of the states . . . may have
to yield to an overriding national interest in uniformity" 75 is more impor-
tant. The issue then becomes whether a national rule should be formu-
lated by the Court or Congress. The current confusion in international
trade, caused in part by the unitary tax coupled with the prospect of its
application by the states to foreign parent corporations, suggests the need
for legislative attention. The growing complexity of applying apportion-
ment formulas to widely disbursed business activities should at least argue
against wide variations in the design of formulas by individual states. The
Multistate Tax Compact, administered by the Multistate Tax Commission,
was upheld by the Supreme Court against constitutional challenge because
the Justices recognized "that as applied to multistate businesses, traditional
state tax administration was insufficient and costly to both state and tax
payer."' 76 The Multistate Tax Compact includes the Uniform Division of
73. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12, 13, Chicago Bridge.
The Solicitor General acted after consultation with the Departments of State, Treasury and
Commerce and the United States Trade Representation. On Dec. 17, 1981, the Chancellor
of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom specifically requested that the United States gov-
ernment participate in the Chicago Bridge case.
74. See letter from Governor Lamar Alexander to President Reagan, Feb. 25, 1982;
letter from Governor Richard Swelling to President Reagan, Aug. 3, 1982, addendums B &
C to Brief of National Governors Assoc. and Hawaii as Amicus Curiae, Container Corp.
75. Memorandum of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 17, Chicago Bridge (quot-
ing Moorman Mfg., 437 U.S. 456.)
76. United States Steel Corp. v, Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 456 (1978). The
challenge was prompted by the decision of the Multistate Tax Comm'n in 1972 to set up a
Joint Audit Program.
[Vol. 32:829
Taxation of Multinational Corporations
Income for Tax Purposes Act77 which incorporates the three factor
formula for apportionment based on sales, property and payroll.7" But
this Uniform Act is effective only in states which choose to join the com-
pact or independently enact a similar formula.7 9 For many years, Congress
has had on its agenda proposals to impose uniform rules for apportion-
ment on the states. The legislative chamber is the appropriate forum for
debating the arguments raised by cases like Container Corp. 80 and Shell
Petroleum N. V Moreover, the Constitution plainly anticipates that the
Court's judgments concerning the negative commerce clause will be sub-
ject to legislative override.
Congress has not yet been able to act on this issue, however, and the
prospects for enactment are not good. Regardless of the Court's holding in
the pending cases or those likely to arise in the future, the area of state
taxation of multinational corporations would benefit from a more thor-
oughgoing consideration by the political branches of government. Con-
gress has the authority to guarantee uniformity and determine the content
of the uniform rules governing reasonable apportionment of income
among the states. Legislative attention to that task would advance the in-
terests of both the nation and the states.
77. 7 U.L.A. 91 (1957). This Act was first promulgated in 1957 by the National Confer-
ence of Commissions on Uniform State Laws.
78. Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act §§ 4-8, 7 U.L.A. 91 (1957)..
79. See G.A.O. REPORT, supra note 2. Thirty-nine states now apply the three-factor
formula. See STATE AND LOCAL TAXES SERV. (P-H) para. 1046.
80. In 1965, a House Committee recommended strict curbs on state apportionment.
H.R. 11798, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). For an extensive review of the proposals made in
the years between 1965 and 1973, see Hearings Before the Subcomm. on State Taxation of
Interstate Commerce, Senate Finance Comm., 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 18-19, 1973); Hel-
lerstein, State Taxation Under the Commerce Clause: An Historical Perspective, 29 VAND. L.
REV. 335 (1976). See also Chicago Budge & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor, 51 U.S.L.W.
3937 (July 6, 1983).
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